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I. Introduction
Exclusive dealing is the requirement that retailers who sell the brands of a particular supplier do
not sell substitute brands. A number of explanations have been given for this vertical restriction.
Two traditional explanations for exclusive dealing are i) that it increases rivals’ costs by closing
off markets for their brands, and ii) that it increases retailer effort by restricting the brands that
they can sell1. More recently, it has been explained as a means to prevent manufacturers free-
riding, for example on the promotion and advertising expenditures of rivals2.
This paper analyses exclusive dealing in New Zealand alcoholic beverage markets. Various
explanations were used to argue against statutory prohibitions on exclusive dealing in New
Zealand alcoholic beverage markets at the turn of the twentieth century. These markets were
probably the first in New Zealand where exclusive dealing was used. Exclusive dealing had two
sets of terms and conditions in these markets. First, retailers received concessionary interest rates
on loans for retail amenity acquisition and improvement from manufacturers and wholesalers in
exchange for exclusive deals (known as the ‘loan-tie’). Second, retailers paid lower rentals on
amenities leased from manufacturers and wholesalers. This second contract was a form of
franchise tying3. Under it, retailers were required to purchase all their beverage requirements
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2from their lessor4, but under the loan-tie, manufacturers of different classes of beverage might
share exclusive contracts5.
The paper is organised as follows. Following this introduction, Section II outlines organisational
features of New Zealand alcoholic beverage markets from 1870 to 1931. Section III discusses
motives for exclusive dealing in these markets. Section IV discusses the payments made to
retailers as compensation for the reduction in choice under exclusive deals. The impact of
exclusive dealing is analysed in Section V. Section VI concludes.
II. The Organisation of New Zealand Alcoholic Beverage Markets
The three major industry groups in New Zealand alcoholic beverage markets at the turn of the
twentieth century were brewers, who manufactured beer, liquor wholesalers who imported beer,
wine and spirits, and publicans, who operated the dominant class of retail outlet, the hotel. All
manufacturers and retailers were licensed, and this was an important determinant of market
structure. For example, from 1874 only imported spirits could be legally consumed in New
Zealand after all licenses to manufacture spirits were revoked. The higher cost of imported
beverages relative to domestically-produced beverages was one reason for the expansion of
market share of beer relative to spirits6. Similarly, publicans’ share of the retail market increased
after 1896 with the withdrawal of the other important class of retail license, the bottle license.
Restrictions on new brewers’ licenses were imposed from 1931, but local monopolies in beer
manufacture existed prior to this for two reasons. First, beer is perishable. This limited the
distance it could be shifted without spoiling prior to the application of chemical preservatives to
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3brewing7. Travel times between markets fell over the twentieth century, but interbrand
competition remained limited until after world war two by variations in brewers’ yeast. Brewers’
yeast was a barrier to new products because exposure to unfamiliar yeast could adversely affect
consumers’ digestive systems. Variations in yeast existed because beer was manufactured in open
vats, which exposed brews to contamination by ‘wild’ airborne yeast. This open-vat practice
persisted until the 1950’s, and until this time the market was characterised by a proliferation of
local brands (Figure 1).
Exclusive dealing became widespread from 1880 after entry to hotels was restricted. From 1880,
new hotel licenses were only issued in licensing districts where the population had increased by
twenty-five per cent, subject to at least sixty per cent of the electoral population of that district
authorising this increase at a licensing poll. Owners of hotel licenses also risked license forfeiture
without compensation. Prior to 1893, this risk arose if publicans were caught offending against
the licensing act8, but from 1893 hotel license issue was subject to referenda. Between 1893 and
1911, either twenty-five per cent or all of the hotel licenses within a licensing district could be
confiscated without compensation, according to the results of a triennial poll taken contiguously
with parliamentary elections9. In the event of partial hotel license confiscation (known as license
reduction), the licenses of hotels operated by publicans caught offending against the licensing
act were automatically confiscated; licensing authorities could at their discretion revoke the
licenses of other hotels that failed to meet minimum amenity standards. Licenses confiscated by
reduction were permanently lost. In the event of confiscation of all the hotel licenses in a
licensing district (known as no-license), licenses remained confiscated unless returned in
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4subsequent referenda. As a consequence, the number of hotels in New Zealand fell from the last
decade of the nineteenth century (Figure 1).
Exclusive dealing was used in approximately seventy five per cent of New Zealand hotels by the
turn of the twentieth century. Nearly all these hotels were in the North Island or the Canterbury
province of the South Island10. Within these provinces, exclusive deals were used more in larger
than in smaller population centres11. Exclusive dealing’s domination of these markets was briefly
reversed around the formation of the leading twentieth century New Zealand brewer, New
Zealand Breweries Ltd.. This company was formed in 1923, and it did not use exclusive deals until
the latter half of the 1930’s12.
The incidence of the two forms of exclusive dealing varied. Twenty years after its establishment,
New Zealand Breweries used loan ties and franchise ties in approximately equal proportions.
More established brewers and liquor wholesalers used franchise ties more than loan ties,
reflecting the fact that they owned more hotels than more recent entrants did. Franchise ties
increased relative to loan ties over the twentieth century as hotel ownership by brewers and
liquor wholesalers increased. They owned hotel freeholds and leaseholds, and used franchise ties
for both forms of ownership. For quality control reasons, brewers used exclusive dealing more
extensively than liquor wholesalers did (Section III)13.
                                               
10 Exclusive dealing was used in South Island provinces other than Canterbury after world war two.
11 For example, by the turn of the twentieth century, almost all the hotels in the largest city (Auckland) were
under exclusive deals, but throughout the Auckland province approximately seventy five per cent of hotels
were. Source: AJHR  (1946) H-38 p 40-45; JALCNZ (1902) no 2 passim.
12 NZB’s share of the beer market was approximately 75 per cent in 1923. It is known to have undertaken
exclusive deals by 1937, although it purchased its first hotel in 1933. Source: Gordon (1993) p 71; Statistics
(1924) p 24; Proceedings (1945) p 4070, p 4211, p 6858; NZB Archives.
13 Source: AJHR  (1946) H-38 p 40-45; JALCNZ (1902) no 2 passim.
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6Exclusive dealing in New Zealand alcoholic beverage markets was prohibited by statute in 1895.
This prohibition was circumvented by making exclusive deals optional and penalising publicans
who chose not to accept them. Those who did not accept exclusive deals paid higher hotel
rentals or higher interest rates on loans than did exclusive dealers. In response to this
circumvention, legislators introduced a bill in 1902 that prohibited alcoholic beverage
manufacturers and wholesalers from owning retail outlets, or providing finance for this
ownership. This bill was not passed, because legislators came to recognise the competitive
aspects of exclusive dealing and the higher costs of alternative capital markets. Submissions by
industry groups to the 1902 bill provide explanations for exclusive dealing discussed in Section
III.
III. Motives for Exclusive Dealing
This section discusses four explanations for exclusive dealing in alcoholic beverage markets.
Three of these were cited in submissions to the 1902 bill, two of which are quality control
arguments. First, exclusive dealing maintained the quality of a perishable product by increasing
its throughput. Second, it prevented brand misrepresentation. The third explanation is that
exclusive dealing eliminated the risk of foreclosure of scarce retail outlets. The argument that in
doing so, exclusive dealing eliminated local monopolies, is also discussed below.
i) Quality control
Brewers argued that restricting the brands of draught beer a retailer sold increased the
throughput of franchised brands. Faster throughput reduced the period in which draught beers
remained open to spoiling, which is why exclusive deals were rigorously enforced on draught
beer but not bottled beer14. Bottled beer was less perishable than the same quantity of draught
beer because it sold in a much smaller container. The absence of foreclosure of bottled beer
                                               
14 Source: JALCNZ no 2 p 11, p 16, p 26, p 44, p 64, p 66, p84, p 87, p 100; Proceedings (1945) p 4307, p 6878.
7markets in turn encouraged bottled beer production relative to draught beer production15. This
increased manufacturers’ quality control, because retailers had no input to bottled beer quality
to the consumer whereas they did affect draught beer quality through their dispensing
technology.
Brewers also argued that exclusive dealing prevented rivals free-riding on investments in
promotion and advertising. Hotels were the important advertising investment made by
manufacturers in turn of the century beer markets; retail amenity quality signaled draught beer
quality16. Brewers also claimed that exclusive dealing prevented retailers from misrepresenting
brands by substituting lower price brands for name brands. Labeling prevented retailers from
switching bottled beer brands, but consumers could not see the origin of draught beer dispensed
from hotel cellars17.
ii) Market security
Securing scarce retail outlets was admitted to be the primary rationale for exclusive dealing.
Restrictions on hotel license issue as alcoholic beverage consumption increased made hotel
licenses scarce. Exclusive dealing eliminated the risk of foreclosure. Brewers argued that secure
markets for their products provided security to new brewery capital formation, offsetting the risk
of confiscation of these assets. It also aggregated demand and lowered demand uncertainty for a
perishable product18.
                                               
15 Between 1911 and 1925, average bottled beer production in New Zealand markets subject to exclusive deals
was approximately 47 per cent of their total beer production, whereas over the same period average bottled
beer production in other New Zealand markets increased from 10 per cent to 14 per cent of their total beer
production. In 1911 the Auckland province produced 25 per cent of national beer production but it accounted
for over 75 per cent by value of bottling inputs purchased. This province had the highest incidence of exclusive
dealing at this time. Source: Statistics.
16 This was related to the issue of throughput. A higher quality amenity suggested more vigorous business, and
hence faster beer turnover, than a low quality amenity. See Proceedings (1945) p 6682, 6725; Hawkins and
Pass (1979) p 84-85; Mulcare (1998) p 65.
17 Source: JALCNZ no 2 ,10-11, 16, 26, 40, 44, 64; Proceedings (1945) p 4307, 6878. For similar arguments for
US and UK  beer markets, see Carlton and Perloff (1994) p 532 and Gourvish and Wilson (1994) p 44-45, 138-
140, respectively.
18 See Carlton (1979). Source: JALCNZ (1902) no 2 p 15, 32 and passim; Proceedings (1945) p 4067, 4285,
4319.
8Exclusive dealing increased rivals’ costs, for two reasons, First, it made the hotels available to
rival manufacturers more scarce, increasing the price that they paid to secure these outlets.
Alternatively, higher distribution costs were incurred in selling through these hotels because of
such factors as poor location19. Second, in order to avoid foreclosure new entrants needed to
contemplate entry at two stages of production20. They incurred sunk costs at both stages in doing
so. Sunk costs were created by uncertainty over license renewals, which from 1893 to 1975
depended on the outcome of licensing referenda. License owners were not compensated in the
event that licenses were not renewed. Retail licenses could also be confiscated without
compensation if retailers contravened licensing laws, and as noted above this risk increased from
the 1870’s. Sunk costs also increased as hotel license prices rose to reflect increasing scarcity.
New Zealand legislators viewed exclusive dealing as a device to secure markets as anti-
competitive, but it may have eliminated local monopolies by transferring demand to dominant
manufacturers. Leading rather than following brands were generally sold under exclusive deals,
since the opportunity cost of restricting choice is lower for the former than for the latter21.
Brewers whose draught beer was excluded from hotels either specialised in the production of
bottled beer or quit the market22. Differentiated local brands existed in part because of consumer
resistance to the unfamiliar yeast of new products. Resistance was overcome by eliminating
these local brands; consumers unwilling to alter their tastes drank (higher price) bottled beer.
IV. Compensation and Exclusive Dealing in Alcoholic Beverage Markets
                                               
19 Hotel license transfers between licensing districts were prohibited from 1881, and within licensing districts
they were limited to a maximum of half a mile (urban licensing districts) or one mile (rural licensing districts)
after 1904. A further issue for distribution is firm size. Economies of scale and scope may have existed in
alcoholic beverage distribution, in which case exclusive dealing raises the costs of smaller brewers more than
the costs of larger brewers. As is noted below, exclusive deals were generally used by larger rather than smaller
firms.
20 Brewers also owned hotels to monitor product quality and to moderate externalities associated with alcohol
consumption: see Mulcare (1998).   
21 See Mathewson and Winter (1987). Source: JALCNZ (1902) no 2 passim; AJHR  (1946) H-38 passim.
22 Bottled beer could be sold direct from the brewery, through liquor wholesalers, and through hotels where
exclusive deals on bottled beer were not rigorously enforced.
9This section outlines the compensation that exclusive publicans received for restricting the
brands they sold. Exclusive dealers are commonly compensated for lower choice through
wholesale price reductions or lower franchise fees. In New Zealand, exclusive publicans either
received hotel rental discounts or discounted interest on loans23. Most publicans were either
lessees or mortgagees, because hotel license scarcity made freehold hotel ownership beyond their
financial resources. Exclusive dealing lowered their fixed costs. This is an example of a traditional
argument for compensation in exclusive deals, namely that exclusive dealers exchange greater
choice for the lower intrabrand competition of exclusive territories24. Intrabrand and interbrand
competition were lower under the fixed territories of alcoholic beverage licensing.
Lower fixed costs for exclusive publicans were associated with higher quality of retail amenity in
markets where exclusive dealing was used. By the turn of the twentieth century, average hotel
capital values in urban markets subject to exclusive dealing were four times higher than average
hotel capital values in other urban markets25. Brewers and liquor wholesalers improved hotels to
advertise, and to comply with minimum amenity standards to lower the risk of license
confiscation in the event of a successful vote for license reduction.
Unlike their British counterparts, New Zealand publicans who paid lower hotel rentals were not
charged higher wholesale prices26. This is supported by wholesale price trends; wholesale beer
prices in markets subject to exclusive deals (‘tied’ markets in Figure 2) were similar to wholesale
beer prices in other markets (‘untied’ markets in Figure 227). Regression analysis also did not find
significant price divergence between tied and untied markets (Section V).
                                               
23 Vertical restrictions promote non-price competition, and this is more effectively achieved through fixed cost
reductions than variable cost reductions. Alcoholic beverages markets are also subject to low price elasticities,
and this may have lowered the effectiveness of wholesale price reductions. Source: Winter (1993); Grant and
Platt (1983) p 35-37, 110-112, 240-241.
24 Source Scherer (1980) p 586. See also Marvel (1982) p 4.
25 Source: Statistics passim. JALCNZ no 2 p 25, 27, 29, 85, 102, 123-132; Proceedings (1945) p 4220, 4180,
4285-4286, 5996, 6014, 6679-6680. Inter-provincial comparisons of hotel values are made problematic by
different provincial license densities and locations, and different provincial levels of the accommodation
facilities attached to hotels.
26 Source: Proceedings p 4068, 4101, 6740, 6777-6784, 6804, 6877-6880; JALCNZ (1902) no 2 p 9, 10, 12, 20,
22, 24-25, 27-28, 41, 50-54, 65, 69, 74, 80, 89; Hawkins and Pass (1979) p 35, 91-92; Gourvish and Wilson
(1994) p 137, 437-441.
27 Tied' provinces are those indicated at 1902 as having at least 75 per cent of hotels subject to an exclusive
deal (Auckland, Taranaki, Hawkes Bay, Wellington and Canterbury). The remaining provinces (Nelson,
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V. The Impact of Exclusive Dealing
This section tests for significant differences in outcomes in alcoholic beverage markets where
exclusive dealing was and was not used. In the process, an assessment can be made of the
relevance of the explanations for exclusive dealing discussed in Section III. Pooled cross-section
regressions are undertaken in Tables 1 and 2 to test the significance of capital stock per brewery,
output per brewery, the number of breweries and brewery input costs in explaining wholesale
beer prices28. The regressions of Table 1 cover the period 1881 to 1911, which is the period for
which exclusive dealing was the dominant means of selling beer in a subset of markets. The
regressions of Table 2 are for the period 1919 to 1931, when most beer did not sell under
exclusive deals in this subset of markets.
                                                                                                                                           
Marlborough, Westland and Otago (including Southland)) are 'untied'. Source: Statistics passim; McIlraith
(1911) p 51-61; Rankin (1991) p 58; JALCNZ no 2 (1902) p 20, p 108 - 113; New Zealand National Archives
Wellington Napier Licensing Court Licensing Register reference AAOW W3244.
28 For a discussion of the variables of Table 1 and 2, see the Appendix. Source: Statistics (1881-1920) passim;
Statistics of Industrial Manufacture (1921-23) passim; Statistics of Factory Production (1924-32) passim;
McIlraith (1911) p 51-61; Paul (1985) passim;  Gordon (1993) p 60; New Zealand Breweries Archives Speights
Branch Trading Account September 1927-March 1932.
11
Figure 2
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Year
Real wholesale beer prices
Real wholesale beer prices
12
In Table 1, positive coefficients are expected on brewery input costs variables; an insignificant or
positive coefficient is expected on the output per brewery variable29. If the number of breweries
is a measure of competitiveness, then prices are expected to be negatively correlated with the
number of breweries. A negative coefficient on the capital stock per brewery variable is also
expected, to reflect undercapitalisation of markets because of the risk of asset confiscation.
Dummy variables are used to test the explanations for exclusive dealing of Section III. Price
divergence between tied and untied markets is tested using a dummy variable that takes the
value of one in tied markets, otherwise zero. A positive coefficient on this variable implies that
prices were higher in tied markets than in untied markets, which would support the hypothesis
that exclusive dealing prevented publicans from switching to lower price brands. The variable
dumcapitalstock/brewery, which is the capital stock per brewery variable multiplied by the
dummy variable, tests the hypothesis that exclusive dealing provided manufacturers with secure
markets for brewery output. If this was the case, capitalisation should be higher in tied markets
than in untied markets, and this would be revealed by a positive coefficient on
dumcapitalstock/brewery. If exclusive dealing was used to maintain quality by increasing beer
throughput, this would be revealed by a negative coefficient on the variable dumoutput/brewery,
which is the output per brewery variable multiplied by the dummy variable30. The variable
dumnumberbreweries represents the impact of the elimination of follower brands by leading
brands. A positive coefficient on this variable implies that wholesale prices fell as the number of
breweries in tied markets fell, which would support the hypothesis that exclusive dealing
eliminated local monopolies.
                                               
29 The regression is:
Price = aq + bic +dk+ gn+ e
Where  q = output per brewery
ic = input costs
k = capital stock per brewery
n = number of breweries
e = error
If price equals average costs (ac), then a = dac/dq = [mc - ac]/q,
where mc =marginal costs. It is expected that mc = ac i.e. that a  = 0.
30 A negative coefficient on this variable would imply that brewery costs fell as throughput increased: see
previous note.
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With one exception, all dummy variables have insignificant coefficients. The one exception is
dumnumberbreweries, which is positive. The coefficients on this variable and on the number of
breweries variable in Regression (2) imply that falling wholesale beer prices were associated with
falling brewery numbers in tied markets but not untied markets. This result is consistent with
exclusive dealing eliminating local monopolies, and it is supported by the results of Table 2,
which covers the period when most beer did not sell under exclusive deals.
Table 2 contains two new brewery input cost variables, bottling costs and residual costs, both of
which are expected to be positively correlated with wholesale prices. The inputcosts variable in
Table 2 is the residual of the extrapolated inputcosts variable of Table 1 and bottling costs and
residual costs; it is expected to be negative. The variable output per brewery is expected to be
insignificant. The capital stock per brewery variable is expected to be insignificant, to reflect the
receding threat of asset confiscation over the interwar period. The number of breweries variable
is expected to be insignificant, as per Table 1. Dummy variables now compare outcomes in untied
markets and formerly tied markets31. Of the dummy variables, only the variable “dummy” may be
expected to be significant explanatory variable of wholesale prices. This is because the
insignificant coefficient on the variable “dummy” in Table 1 implied that there was no significant
difference in wholesale prices between tied and untied markets; such a relationship might exist
in the absence of exclusive dealing, that is between untied and formerly tied markets.
                                               
31 The expression ‘formerly tied’ is used to denote that most, but not all beer, no longer sold under exclusive
deals after 1919.
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Table 1
Pooled Cross Section Regressions of Wholesale Prices 1881-1911
=============================================================
(1) (2) 
Dependent variable Price Price  
Constant -.012 -.0098
 (.010) (.025)
INPUTCOSTS .61*** .53***
(.063)  (.065)
OUTPUT/BREWERY .054 .064
(.046)  (.086)
CAPITAL STOCK/BREWERY -.084*** -.14*
(.034)  (.074)
NUMBER OF BREWERIES .12*** .0093
(.044) (.14)
DUMMY -.023
(.028)
DUMNUMBERBREWERIES .16*
(.09)
DUMCAPITALSTOCK/BREWERY .10
(.079)
DUMOUTPUT/BREWERY -.043
(.093)
R2  .84 .84
15
F 38 41
standard errors in parentheses
= significant at least at the 5% level; *** = significant at least at the 1% level
For a definition of variables, see Appendix
Table 2
Pooled Cross Section Regressions of Wholesale Prices 1919-1931
=============================================================
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable Price Price
Constant -.0023 -.020
 (.010)  (.014)
INPUTCOSTS .34*** .41***
(.067)  (.064)
OUTPUT/ BREWERY -.41*** -.62***
(.088)  (.10)
CAPITAL STOCK/BREWERY .065 .17***
(.046)  (.060)
NUMBER OF BREWERIES -.48*** -.91***
(.13)  (.16)
BOTTLECOSTS/OUTPUT .13*** .12***
(.030) (.030)
RESIDUALCOSTS/OUTPUT .092*** .068***
(.036) (.033)
DUMOUTPUT/BREWERY .28***
(.11)
DUMCAPITALSTOCK/BREWERY -.20***
 (.089)
DUMNUMBERBREWERIES .21
(.18)
DUMMY .036*
 (.022)
16
R2  .52 .63
F 12.0 12.0
standard errors in parentheses
* = significant at least at the 5% level; *** = significant at least at the 1% level
For a definition of variables, see Appendix
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There are a number of important results of Table 2. First, in the absence of exclusive dealing, the
number of breweries is negatively correlated with wholesale prices and the coefficient on
dumnumberbreweries is insignificant. This implies that rising wholesale beer prices were
associated with falling brewery numbers in both untied and formerly tied markets. Furthermore,
the positive coefficient on the dummy variable implies that wholesale prices were higher in
formerly tied markets than in untied markets. The negative coefficient on output per brewery in
Table 2 was not expected, but it is compatible with the existence of local monopolies in beer
manufacture32. These results are interpreted as implying that interbrand competition was lower
after exclusive dealing was no longer in common use. This is supported by the coefficients on the
dumoutput/brewery and output per brewery variables; in Table 2, a 1 per cent decrease in output
per brewery in untied markets was associated with a 0.62 per cent increase in wholesale prices,
whereas the same decrease in output per brewery in formerly tied markets was associated with a
0.34 per cent increase in wholesale prices. This suggests that interbrand competition was lower
in untied markets than in formerly tied markets where a few brewers still used exclusive dealing.
The positive coefficient on the capital stock per brewery in Table 2 was not expected. The
coefficients on this variable and on the dumcapitalstock/brewery variable imply that markets in
untied markets were overcapitalised but markets in formerly tied markets were not. This might be
explained by superior information in formerly tied markets. New brewery capital formation
increased as the threat of asset confiscation receded over the interwar period. Brewers in
formerly tied markets were able to make accurate forecasts based on past information on
demand derived from exclusive dealing33. Brewers in untied markets did not possess this
information, and inaccurate predictions of demand caused excess capacity in these markets.
VI. Conclusion
                                               
32 That is, mc< ac (see note 29).
33 Exclusive dealing allowed brewers to aggregate and directly observe demand at retail outlets: see Carlton
(1979);  Vaizey (1960) p 400; Hawkins and Pass (1979) p 105; Proceedings (1945) passim.
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New Zealand brewers and liquor wholesalers explained exclusive dealing as a means to secure
scarce retail outlets, to maintain quality of a perishable product, and to avoid misrepresentation
of brands. Data support only the first of these explanations. Using exclusive dealing to secure
markets was not anti-competitive, but on the contrary it eliminated local monopolies.
Eliminating local brands was necessary to overcome consumer resistance and transfer demand to
dominant manufacturers. Consumers were compensated for lower choice by lower wholesale
beer prices and by improved retail amenities.
Foreclosure was primarily caused by the scarcity of retail outlets created by licensing. Legislators
recognised this, but a prohibition on exclusive dealing was more feasible politically than market
liberalisation was. That manufacturers and wholesalers would offer what was essentially a bribe
to retailers to accept exclusive deals was viewed merely as a conveyancing device to circumvent
this prohibition. Legislators did not recognise that such bribes were implicit in exclusive
contracts, and that retailers were not compelled to take them. Instead, they sought to tighten up
existing legislation by placing even greater restrictions on alcoholic beverage markets. This bill
was not passed, in part because a majority of the legislature came to accept the pro-competitive
arguments for exclusive dealing promoted not only by manufacturers but also by their exclusive
dealers.
19
Appendix
Variables of Table 1
Dependent variable is average annual wholesale provincial draught beer prices.
All independent variables are quinquennial provincial observations converted to first differences
of logarithms. They are as follows:
i) Inputcosts is a five-year moving average of yearly provincial prices of barley, sugar, and
coopers’ wages, weighted by the relative expenditure on each variable by breweries in
each province.
ii) number of breweries is the number of registered breweries
iii) capital stock/brewery is the real value of brewery capital divided by the number of
registered breweries
iv) output/brewery is brewery output divided by the number of registered breweries
v) dummy is the dummy variable, with tied markets assigned a dummy of 1, otherwise 0
(see note 26 for a definition of tied markets)
vi) dumnumberbreweries = dummy x number of breweries;
vii) dumoutput/brewery = dummy x output/brewery
viii) dumcapital stock/brewery = dummy capital stock/brewery.
Variables of Table 2
Except for the following variables, the variables of Table 2 are the same as those of Table 1
except that they are annual rather than quinquennial data and they include data on malthouses.
Dependent variable is the total provincial value of ale and stout (excluding duty) divided
by the total provincial production of ale and stout.
Independent Variables:
i) Inputcosts weights the provincial prices of barley, malt, sugar, and coopers wages (each
estimated as expenditure divided by quantity purchased) by the relative expenditure on
each variable by breweries in each province
ii) Bottling costs equals expenditure on non-returnable bottles and casks, plus expenditure
on corks, capsules, etc, plus expenditure on other brewing materials, all divided by
brewery output.
iii) Residual costs equal residual expenses divided by brewery output. Data on residual
expenses was not given in 1919 and it is estimated by weighting total provincial
expenses in 1919 by the share of residual expenses in total expenses in 1920.
20
iv) Dummy - the dummy variable, with formerly tied markets assigned a value of 1,
otherwise 0. Formerly tied markets are the same markets as Table 1’s tied markets.
21
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